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Conclusion:
The Mobilizing Potential of Class Actions
LYNN MATHER*

The political dimensions of class actions pervade both the scholarly
discussion of such litigation and the strategies and outcomes of the cases
themselves. While the debate over the legitimacy and capacity of judicial
handling of questions of institutional reform continues, the political
significance of class actions stands out. For example, in 1981, more than
forty-eight percent of all appropriations for the city of Boston were subject to judicial supervision; these appropriations covered the operations
of city schools, police and fire fighters, city jails, and city housing through
the Boston Housing Authority.' State care of the mentally retarded, administration of prisons in more than one-half the states, and operation of
numerous state bureaucracies are subject to judicial supervision. The
studies in this volume provide additional examples of attempts to
reform-through class action litigation -services provided by public
schools 2 and by public hospitals.' The purpose of this comment is to suggest how certain issues and questions raised by political scientists may
be applied to analysis of class action litigation, with particular attention
to the articles in this symposium.
Observers of this public law litigation frequently criticize court intervention in so-called "political" matters. From the perspective of a political
scientist, however, this criticism is curious and puzzling. The study of
politics, after all, is the study of the authoritative allocation of values:
in Harold Lasswell's famous definition, the study of who gets what, when,
and how.4 It is hard to imagine an analysis of any court case which did
not acknowledge the political nature of the judicial activity involved.'
Public values are allocated by judges with every decision favoring a
creditor over a debtor, a husband over a wife in a divorce, or an injured
plaintiff over a negligent defendant. When discrete, individual events and
relationships are rephrased into legal language for the purpose of court
action, values of society are inevitably involved through the very con* B.A. 1967, University of California at Los Angeles; Ph.D. 1975, University of California
at Irvine. Associate Professor, Department of Government, Dartmouth College.
Turner, Governingfrom the Bench, Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 8, 1981, Magazine, at 12.
- Rosenberg & Phillips, The Institutionalizationof Conflict in the Reform of Schools: A
Case Study of Court Implementation of the PARC Decree, 57 IND. L.J. 425 (1982).
3 Paul-Shaheen & Perlstadt, Class Action Suits And Social Change: The Organization
And Impact of the Hill-Burton Cases, 57 IND. L.J. 385 (1982).
1 D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 119-24 (1953) (citing H. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS
WHAT, WHEN, How (1936)).
' See. e.g., Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the 'Public' in 'PublicLaw',
5 P.S.: POL. Sci. 412 (1972).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:451

cepts and rules of law applied.6 Judges may define standards of "reasonable
care" in tort cases or of "adequate support" in marital support cases in
the same way that they provide substantive definitions of "adequate treatment" or "appropriate education" in cases involving public institutions.
One seems no less political than the other.
One difference in these recent court cases is said to lie in the legislative
nature of their decisions.' This very recent debate over trial court involvement in institutional reform thus continues the discussion of twenty years
ago over the lawmaking aspects of Supreme Court decisions 8 (a discussion which itself invokes the writings of the legal realists of the previous
generation). However, there has been a significant shift in the nature of
the dialog away from questions of the legitimacy of court actions in overtly
political issues and toward a focus on the capacity of courts to handle
these matters and on the consequences of their doing so. This shift is
evident in the studies of the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children (PARC) litigation in Philadelphia9 and the Hill-Burton cases.'"
Conclusions in these papers emphasize the limits and weaknesses inherent
in courts as they attempt to handle problems in complex institutions, with
a variety of parties involved, and without the resources to secure compliance with their decisions.
But courts, as political actors, must be understood in the broader context of policymaking in this country. While the distinction between
lawmaking, adjudicative, and executive functions is clear in theory, as
well as on organizational charts of American government, empirical studies
of policymaking suggest that these functions tend to converge and overlap
in practice." Given federalism and decentralization of power, policies are
shaped by the continuous interaction and negotiation among various
governmental bodies and private interest groups. The question then is:
What is the role of the courts in these negotiations? An understanding
of the role of lower courts may be reached by considering arguments raised about the Supreme Court's role and the role of lawyers in effecting
political change.
COURTS AND POLICYMAKING
A well-known characterization of the Supreme Court's role in policymakThis point is developed more fully by Mather & Yngvesson, Language. Audience. and
the Tranqbriation of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 775 (1980-81).
See. e.g., Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 2; D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY (1977).

' Compare A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

(1962) with

M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND

(1964).
Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 2.

POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT

,0 Paul-Shaheen & Perlstadt, supra note 3.

For discussion of this convergence and overlap, see recent American government textbooks which emphasize this interaction-for example, D. SULLIVAN, R. NAKAMURA & R.
WINTERS, How AMERICA IS RULED (1980).
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ing is Robert Dahl's portrayal of the Court as supporter and legitimator
of policies conceived by the dominant national political alliance of Congress and the President.'2 The Court, Dahl argued, participates actively
in policymaking but only "within the somewhat narrow limits set by the
basic policy goals of the dominant alliance."' 3 Dahl pointed to the inevitable
politics of judicial recruitment to help explain why Supreme Court actions
would ultimately not override the wishes of the President and Congress,
concluding that "[b]y itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the
course of national policy."'4 This is the same conclusion reached by
Rosenberg and Phillips in their study of the Philadelphia schools case:
the courts alone, "without the support of government officials, elite groups
and public opinion," do not have the power or resources to secure the
rights of disadvantaged minorities. ' s There is unquestionably support for
this position, as evidenced by the careful study of negotiations in the
PARC case. What must be remembered, however, is that other governmental bodies operate in precisely the same position. The Pennsylvania
legislature, for example, acting alone, without the support of the Governor,
courts, elite groups, or public opinion, would face tremendous difficulties
establishing complete educational programs for the mentally retarded.
The legislature could pass a law, and override a Governor's veto, but
legislators would need additional political and public support for implementation. Jonathan Casper made this point in an important critique of the
Dahl argument, in which he noted that no institution is really capable
of the decisive role that the Court is said to lack."6
Casper's analysis also suggested other difficulties with the critical,
limited role Dahl assigned to courts in protecting minority rights. The
entire framework of the relative influence of courts vis-a-vis other branches of government, with clear winners and losers emerging from policy
debates, is too narrow. 7 In Massachusetts, for example, some elected officials have welcomed successful lawsuits against their own institutions
because these class actions allow the politicians to avoid dealing with controversial issues.'8 When hospital officials privately support the plaintiffs
who are suing them, then it is hard to assign winner or loser positions
to the outcomes. A broader conception of policymaking recognizes three
points. First, policy results from a complex interaction of different
institutions and groups.' 9 Second, outcomes at any one time provide ten-

" Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker,
6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
" Id. at 293-94.
" Id. at 293.
Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 2, at 449.
' Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sol. REV. 50, 60
(1976).
Id. at 61-62.
" Turner, supra note 1, at 13.
" Casper, supra note 14, at 62.
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tative resolutions to conflicts, but policy will continue to be fashioned
and refashioned through succeeding elections, administrative orders,
lawsuits, and so forth. " Third, and perhaps most important for assessing
the role of courts in policymaking, policies are made in ways other than
through direct court orders or passage of laws. Casper has suggested:
Providing effective access to participants who wish to take part in
decision making, placing issues on the agenda of public opinion and
of other political institutions, providing an imprimatur of legitimacy
to one side or another that may affect its ability to attract adherents,
mobilize resources, and build institutions -these are all important parts
of the policy-making process that may get lost if we pay attention
only to winners and losers.21
The greater power of the Philadelphia Association for Retarded
Children (Philarc) illustrates how representatives of the interests of the
mentally retarded gained formal and informal access to policymaking
within the Philadelphia schools as a direct result of the litigation process.'
While the other groups in the plaintiff class, speaking for the more
severely retarded pupils, did not fare so well,' that fact should not
diminish the increased status of the group representing the majority of
the retarded pupils. 4 That this organized group, Philarc, was legitimated
and afforded greater power vis-a-vis the schools through the class action
process suggests an important way in which class actions can facilitate
change. That is, the assertion of legal rights can strengthen the political
bargaining position of an organized group.
Professor Garth, in his introductory essay, notes problems in the
assumption that class action suits plus lawyers will lead to enforced legal
rights." Scheingold also discussed this assumption in more general terms,
calling it the "myth of rights"; the myth is premised on a direct linkage
between legal rights, formal litigation which attempts to realize these
rights, and resultant social change." The myth is, however, only a myth,
largely unsupported as an empirical proposition but extremely important
as an ideological symbol for Americans. In contrast, thinking about a
"politics of rights" leads to clearer explanations of the linkage between
rights, litigation, and change.' Specifically, legal rights can be seen as
political resources to be used in a process of political mobilization. Rights
can aid in activating people to question the existing order, in organizing
0 Id.
21

Id. at 63.

Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 2, at 445.
Id. at 446.
24

Id. at 445.

25 Garth,
26

Introduction: Toward a Sociology of the Class Action, 57

S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 5, 13-79 (1974).

" Id. at 6-9.

IND.

L. J. 371 (1982).
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collective political groups, and in promoting a realignment of political
forces. 28 By using legal rights in politically astute ways, groups can improve their chances for securing meaningful change. This strategy,
however, requires sensitivity to realities of political negotiation and the
need for collective organization, an awareness of other political groups
with which to join forces, and an understanding of ways in which legal
activity is like-rather than unlike- political activity. Thus, this "politics
of rights" has implications for class actions.29
CLASS ACTIONS AND DISPUTE TRANSFORMATION
Whenever a grievance or quarrel becomes a claim at law before a third
party, a critical process of transformation is under way. This process
redefines the events or relationships in question into terms of a normative
framework shared by a wider group than just the two parties.2 0 Typically,
dispute tranformations narrow issues into established categories, thus
preserving and reinforcing the political order through the process of litigation. However, some transformations attempt to challenge the established
order by redefining issues or persons in unconventional ways, and it is
in these cases of expansion that one can see potential for broad change."
The development of potential for change through expansion may depend
in part upon the role of the audience to the proceedings because audience
mobilization may be critical to sustained acceptance of any new or altered
definition of issues.' Another important consideration is language or other
symbols used to define issues.3 In several instances dramatic images have
aided in a process of dispute transformation which challenged the
established order. 4 Combining these ideas on dispute expansion with the
concept of the "politics of rights," one can see why the health care cases
described by Paul-Shaheen and Perlstadt did not lead to broad change,
despite the significant rule changes in some of the cases.
Consider, for example, the relevant audience for the lawyers and judges
handling the various Hill-Burton cases. The audience appears to have been.
the network of other health-specialist lawyers, along with administrators
directly responsible for the hospital construction funds that were
distributed under the Hill-Burton Act-that is, a narrow, highly specialized
public. In addition, the language in which the cases were couched was
Id. at 131-48.
For a discussion of certain class actions in the context of the "politics of rights," see
text accompanying notes 30-39 infi-a.
Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 6, at 783-88.
Id. at 797-818.
Id. at 782, 797-801.
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 810-17.
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limited and technical. The argument that certain hospitals should provide health care to the poor was persuasive, based on the specific, legal
grounds of the Hill-Burton Act." Because of its highly technical and
restricted nature, however, the argument lacked a link with a broader
conceptual framework. What was needed-and was lacking here-was
a framework which would directly invoke the basic issue of hospital care
for the poor. The lawyers in these Hill-Burton cases placed their significant energies in realizing the legal rights for their clients. Had they placed
more energy into using those rights as political instruments to mobilize
people, they perhaps might have been more successful overall in effecting change. Lawyers on the whole, however, would disparage such a
suggestion. Their training, expertise, and inclination lead to a focus on
specialized legal channels rather than political organization. 6
A third study, on farmworkers' litigation in California, provides a contrasting example of class action with greater resultant change. 7 The
lawyers involved in this case were sensitive to the need to reach a broad
public, rather than just a specialized legal public. The case, advanced by
lawyers at California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) in the late 1960's
on behalf of farmworkers, challenged the growers' insistence on use of
"El Cortito," the short-handled hoe. 8 This type of hoe was, according to
farm management, a more efficient and accurate instrument than the longhandled hoe.39 But workers challenged its alleged efficiency and pointed
instead to its use as a means of supervision and control; the short-handled
hoe was an oppressive employer tool which also led directly to severe
back injuries among the workers. 0 The hoe became known as El Cortito,
a symbol of the exploitation and hardship of farmworkers in California,
and workers' protests against the hoe were futile."
The litigation challenging the use of El Cortito began at a time of
increasing organization of farmworkers and a 1960's social climate in
California that was sympathetic to the workers' demands.42 How did the
CRLA lawyers succeed in their efforts to abolish use of El Cortito? Clearly
they worked hard at gathering relevant evidence on worker productivity
and on medical dangers of the hoe. They also planned their legal challenges
carefully to fit within parameters of an administrative code which prohibPaul-Shaheen & Perlstadt, supra note 3,at 390-92.
SCHEINGOLD, supra note 26, at 140-41.
1 Murray, The Abolition of El Cortito, The Short-Handled Hoe: A Case Study In Social

3
'

Conflict And State Policy In California Agriculture, 30 Soc. PROB.

__

(1982) (article to

be published in October). The studies by Paul-Shaheen and Perlstadt, by Rosenberg and
Phillips, and by Murray were presented in the same panel to the American Sociological
Association at its meeting in Toronto in August of 1982.
:'Id.
" Id.

° Id.
'

Id.

..Id.
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ited use of "unsafe" tools. 3 The state bureaucracy, however, was dominated by interests sympathetic to agribusiness; the farmworkers thus
had an uphill battle to convince state interests to intercede on their behalf
against farm employers. Significantly, CRLA lawyers worked to reach
a wide audience with their cause. Using the dramatic imagery of stoop
labor with El Cortito, the lawyers redefined the issue into one of basic
conflict between underdog and oppressor." The media publicized the case
extensively, adding legitimacy to the CRLA side and focusing public attention on the case.
By the time the case reached the California Supreme Court, the CRLA
lawyers had gathered evidence to support their humanitarian argument
for abolition, to demonstrate the existence of a viable economic alternative
in the long-handled hoe, and to appeal to taxpayers concerned with
minimizing payments for disability and unemployment (payments needed
for workers injured by the use of the short-handled hoe). These arguments
"successfully linked the case with a broader constituency by appealing
not only to their moral sensibilities but their economic interests.""5 The
CRLA won a favorable ruling from the California Supreme Court in 1974
abolishing the use of El Cortito."6
In this case a legal right (for employees to be protected from unsafe
tools) was used through a class action lawsuit to cause significant change
in social practice. The legal doctrine covering occupational safety was expanded in this case to apply to an agricultural implement which was not
"unsafe" in the conventional statutory interpretation. The wide audience
mobilized in support of the CRLA position played a crucial role in sustaining this expanded definition. Thus, this case illustrates an important
possibility for change through class actions: the potential for mobilizing
a relevant public to support an issue. Other cases that have similarly performed this role include those by women employees challenging their
salaries in comparison to men's salaries, focusing on the issue of equal
pay for work of comparable value." A view of class actions that emphasizes
their organizing potential, especially through the symbolic politics
surrounding the case,48 suggests a possibility for at least some resultant
change.
The Philadelphia schools case illustrates another aspect of this mobilizing potential. Through the process of litigation, an organization was
strengthened and legitimated as an important participant in the
"

ht.

I&.
*;hi.
See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 17 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 906 (D.
Colo. 1978), q.J)d, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Mather
& Yngvesson, supra note 6, at 808-09.
" Sev'. e.g., M. El)ELNIAN, THE SYMBOI1C USES OF POLITICS 152-71 (1964).

458
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policymaking process. This conclusion to the symposium thus emphasizes
the possibilities for change through class actions rather than the constraints inherent in such litigation. Such change will be limited and incremental, contingent to an extent on the political strength of those
supporting the change; change will not be of a major, fundamental nature
simply through one lawsuit. But such a limit exists as well for lawmaking
in administrative and legislative arenas. Therefore, successful use of class
action litigation for change requires sensitivity not only to the intricate
legal argument and procedure, but also to the ways in which the case
itself can be used to increase political support for a cause and to change
the very terms and framework of the debate in the wider political
environment.

